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 Within a day or two after 9/11, as the shock was wearing off, it occurred to me that the 
legal fallout of the attacks would be varied and profound. I cannot recall which areas of the 
law I thought at the time were most likely to be affected, but certainly they included criminal 
law. I also reckoned there would be litigation arising simply from the loss of the buildings 
and that these losses would present significant commercial insurance issues. With National 
Guard troops posted on the streets and in train stations, it also seemed likely that Posse 
Comitatus Act1 issues would arise.
 Based on these early observations, the attacks seemed to furnish the occasion for a new 
law review dedicated to examining the 9/11 fallout. My thought was that, unlike normal 
law reviews, this one would be designed to expire once things died down. I thought there 
might be a few lively years.
 Nothing came of it, despite my effort to interest a law school in New York (not New York 
Law School) in the idea. On the other hand, existing law reviews have risen to the occasion, 
producing a rich post-9/11 literature over the last decade. Entirely new journals have sprung 
up, such as the Journal of National Security Law and Policy, on the editorial board of 
which I sit.2 While more broadly cast than what I had in mind, many of the Journal’s 
offerings fall under the post-9/11 rubric. The last decade has also witnessed the explosive 
growth of the blogosphere, where there is no shortage of excellent, rigorous, and pertinent 
sites.3
 Given this background, I am especially pleased that New York Law School decided two 
years ago to co-sponsor this symposium on civil liberties ten years after 9/11 with the 
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies and the American Constitution Society 
for Law and Policy, and that the New York Law School Law Review is dedicating this 
issue to the program.
 For many years, my main area of study and practice has been military law. In this 
article, I will assess how 9/11 has influenced the development of law and legal institutions 
in that field. In the process, I will at times get out of my lane to offer a few broader 
observations.
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The 9/11 attacks have influenced virtually every aspect of the world of military 
law. Part I of this article addresses its effects on military justice, which is the law 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
2. The first issue of the Journal appeared in 2005. According to an introductory note from Dean Elizabeth 
Rindskopf Parker of the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, “it took the 9/11 attacks 
more than a decade [after the fall of the Berlin Wall] to begin the process of awakening a fuller 
understanding of the implications of [the end of the Cold War] for our new century.” Elizabeth 
Rindskopf Parker, Why a Journal of National Security Law & Policy?, 1 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 1 
(2005).
3. See, e.g., Lawfare: Hard Nat’l Sec. Choices, http://www.lawfareblog.com (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011); see also Nat’l Sec. Advisors, http://www.natseclaw.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); Am. Univ. 
Wash. Coll. of Law, Nat’l Sec. L. Brief, http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com (last visited Mar. 
27, 2011); Robert Chesney’s [Nat’ l Security L.] Listserv Archive, J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y, http://chesney.
jnslp.com (last visited April 7, 2011).
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governing the internal discipline of armed forces. Part II considers the Guantánamo 
detentions and the military commissions conducted there. Part III summarizes 
developments with respect to the rights of military personnel, while Part IV describes 
some impacts of 9/11 on the bar. Parts V and VI, respectively, identify instances in 
which the military was misused and the effects of 9/11 on the judiciary. This 
catalogue is not intended to be exhaustive, but it will give a sense of the pervasive 
effects of 9/11. Some are disturbing, such as the Supreme Court’s seeming indifference 
to the stately pace of Guantánamo habeas corpus litigation, and a few are modestly 
encouraging, if not exactly a cause for celebration, such as the constructive role played 
by the Judge Advocates General. In Part VII, I provide some concluding remarks.
 Just what were the effects of 9/11 on military justice? It depends on whether the 
question is limited to direct effects or includes indirect effects as well. If one includes 
the second Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan, the effects have been substantial. 
New challenges have faced the conventional military justice system, by which I mean 
the system of courts-martial used for ensuring good order and discipline among our 
military personnel.4 Despite the fact that a high tempo of military operations tends 
to reduce the disciplinary caseload, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated 
numerous high-profile incidents that have tested the military justice system. These 
include well-known cases, such as those that arose at the Abu Ghraib detention 
facility in Iraq,5 and others that arose under actual battlefield conditions in both 
countries.6 Many observers—myself included—have wondered whether military 
commanders were slower than they should have been in referring charges to courts-
martial, and whether court-martial members (i.e., jurors) were too quick to permit 
“fog of war” claims to influence their thinking, thus making them slower to convict 
and, in the event of a conviction, less likely to impose a harsh sentence.7 Only now 
are we at a point where actual outcomes can be evaluated and judgments reached on 
these matters, as Marine judge advocate and now-professor Gary D. Solis brilliantly 
did after the dust settled in Vietnam.8
 One byproduct of the military operations that followed 9/11 was a congressional 
attempt to revive the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. Such 
jurisdiction was permitted by Congress until the 1950s, when a string of Supreme 
Court cases effectively confined military justice personal jurisdiction to individuals 
4. Courts-martial are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for 
Courts-Martial (MCM). See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950 (2006); Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States (2008), http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Harman, 68 M.J. 325 
(C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
6. E.g., United States v. Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
7. The full story remains to be told. See generally William C. Peters, Adjudication Deferred: Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes and U.S. Military Justice from My Lai to Haditha and Beyond, 37 
Nationalities Papers 925 (2009).
8. See Gary D. Solis, Military Justice, Civilian Clemency: The Sentences of Marine Corps War Crimes in South 
Vietnam, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 59 (2000); see also Gary D. Solis, Son Thang: An 
American War Crime (1997) (focusing on a single incident that took place in 1970 in Vietnam).
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who are in the military9 (and presumably certain military retirees).10 In 2006, Senator 
Lindsey O. Graham, Republican of South Carolina, led the revival effort, eventually 
leading to an amendment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to permit 
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying 
an armed force in the field in time of a declared war or a “contingency operation,”11 a 
defined term under the UCMJ12 that includes the wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
 Given the precedents, this extension of court-martial jurisdiction raises serious 
civil liberties issues, and perhaps for this reason the armed forces have been loath to 
employ it. A mere handful of cases involving civilian contractor personnel has arisen 
in Iraq,13 but the sentences handed down in these proceedings have been so short 
that they do not even qualify for normal review in the military appellate courts.14 
Other threatened prosecutions collapsed when injunctions were sought in federal 
district court in Washington, D.C.15 The Obama administration has trod very 
carefully in furthering the implementation of the new law. The 2010 amendments to 
the Manual for Courts-Martial cautioned that
9. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 
(1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 
(1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
10. E.g., Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (upholding court-martial jurisdiction over a 
retired Navy Rear Admiral); United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637 (1958). The Supreme Court 
referred to potential court-martial jurisdiction over retired regulars in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 
210, 221 (1981). See generally J. Mackey Ives & Michael J. Davidson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over 
Retirees under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
11. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006) (amended by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006)). The 2006 legislation added the requirement for a 
declaration of war, in response to cases that had held the earlier statute could not be applied to Vietnam 
since Congress had never declared war there. Id.; United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363 (1970). 
The 2006 amendment also added the “contingency operations” provision. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). 
For a discussion of the expansion of court-martial jurisdiction to contractors, see Eugene R. Fidell, 
Criminal Prosecution of Civilian Contractors by Military Courts, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 845 (2009).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2006).
13. See, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, Army Interpreter Sentenced at Court-Martial, L.A. Times, June 24, 2008, at 
A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/24/world/fg-interpreter24. 
14. For example, in the case noted immediately above, the sentence was five months of confinement. Id. To 
be eligible for review by the service court of criminal appeals, a court-martial sentence must be at least a 
year of confinement or include a bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge or (in the case of a commissioned 
officer) a dismissal. 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1) (2006).
15. E.g., Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Price v. Gates, No. 1:09-cv-00106 (D.D.C. Jan. 
16, 2009). This action for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed on January 26, 2009 (ten days after it 
was filed), when military authorities advised the petitioner that then secretary of defense Robert M. 
Gates had decided to withhold authority for the Air Force to try him by court-martial. See Keith Rogers, 
No court-martial for man suspected in spy plane fire, Las Vegas Review-Journal (Jan. 23, 2009), http://
www.lvrj.com/news/38209139.html; John O’Connor, Comment to BIG news: U.S. not to proceed with 
charges against civilian contractor, CAAFLOG (Jan. 26, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.caaf log.
com/2009/01/23/big-news-u-s-not-to-proceed-with-charges-against-civilian-contractor/. 
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[c]ourt-martial jurisdiction over civilians under the [UCMJ] is limited by the 
Constitution and other applicable laws, including as construed in judicial 
decisions. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(11) in peace time has 
been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Before 
initiating court-martial proceedings against a civilian, relevant statutes, 
decisions, service regulations, and policy memoranda should be carefully 
examined.16
No one should expect widespread use of this controversial authority to court-martial 
civilians.
ii. thE MiLitarY and thE gUantánaMO dEtainEEs
 The most significant 9/11 civil liberties issues have, of course, concerned not 
Americans in uniform or civilian contractors, but those whom we have detained and 
sought to prosecute before military commissions. Setting aside the question of 
detention, which has led to an astounding amount of litigation, the revival of the 
military commissions stands as one of the major civil liberties legacies of the 9/11 
era. The tale is a grim one.
 What to do about people captured in the course of operations against al-Qaeda 
(which conducted the 9/11 attacks) and the Taliban (which harbored al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan)? The choices were few. One approach was to prosecute those we were 
able to capture before a federal district court, as was done with the perpetrators of the 
first World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993.17 Another alternative was to 
prosecute them before general courts-martial, which have authority to try offenses 
against the law of war by persons who are subject to the law of war.18 The Bush 
administration did not follow that route, even though it had been urged by experts.19 
Instead, only two months after 9/11, President George W. Bush issued a Military 
16. Exec. Order No. 13,552, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,263, 54,269 (Aug. 31, 2010), amending Rules for Court-
Martial 202(a) (Discussion).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming conviction); United States v. 
Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming sentence with minor modifications as to fine and 
restitution).
18. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006).
19. See generally Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military 
Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed 
Conflicts, 167 Mil. L. Rev. 74 (2001) (proposing that United States place war criminals before general 
courts-martial under control of a U.S. commander); Robinson O. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums 
for Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 (1994) (concluding that 
American courts-martial are viable alternatives to specially constituted international tribunals for trying 
crimes against the law of nations); Neal Katyal, Invent This Wheel!!! Now can we try using courts-martial 
for enemy detainees?, Slate (July 11, 2006, 4:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2145512/ (arguing that 
following the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down President Bush’s military commission system at 
Guantánamo Bay, Congress should now seriously consider instituting a courts-martial system); Neal 
Katyal, Sins of Commissions: Why aren’t we using the courts-martial system at Guantanamo?, Slate (Sept. 8, 
2004, 11:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2106406/ (laying out the benefits of a courts-martial system 
as compared to the Bush administration’s use of military commissions).
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Order authorizing the creation of military commissions,20 a type of military court not 
used since the aftermath of World War II.21 These were contemplated by the UCMJ, 
but many of the details were not spelled out.22 The Bush commissions were slow to 
get off the ground, and eventually, after the Supreme Court found them flawed,23 
Congress stepped in and passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).24 In 
2009, another Military Commissions Act was passed,25 but to date the government 
has prosecuted only a handful of cases under it and the predecessor arrangements.26
 Many concerns have been expressed about the use of military commissions. 
Should the strict rules of evidence apply, as they do in courts-martial?27 Should 
evidence obtained by coercion short of torture be admissible? Should evidence 
obtained without Miranda28 warnings be admitted? What restrictions should be 
imposed on the media in attempting to cover military commission trials?29 But one 
20. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 
57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001); Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions and Administrative Law, 6 Green Bag 
2d 379, 379 n.1 (2003).
21. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006). In Hamdan, Justice Stevens explained that military 
commissions have been used in three situations: (1) as substitutes for civilian courts when martial law 
has been declared; (2) as occupation courts to try civilians in the absence of civil government; and (3) “as 
an ‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary measures 
those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of 
war.’” Id. at 595–97 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)). Hamdan involved the third 
type.
22. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821, 836, 847–48, 850 (2006).
23. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557. The Supreme Court had earlier determined that foreign nationals held at 
Guantánamo Bay could seek writs of habeas corpus. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). In Boumediene 
v. Bush, the Court held that the part of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) that sought to preclude 
habeas corpus petitions by Guantánamo detainees was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 553 
U.S. 723 (2008).
24. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
25. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
26. 1 M.C. (Oct. 2006–June 2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/reporter_june19.
pdf ?rd=1; 2 M.C. ( Jan. 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/2MC_Issue2_
January2010.pdf?rd=1. Military commission decisions are unofficially reported in the Military 
Commission Reporter, published by the National Institute of Military Justice. 
27. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (Supp. II 2008); compare Fed. R. Evid., with Mil. R. Evid.
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that police officers advise civilians of their 
constitutional rights before questioning them).
29. One notable controversy involved the expulsion of four journalists from the military commissions 
because they had written articles naming a witness who had previously identified himself in the news 
media. The matter was the subject of negotiations between the Department of Defense and the affected 
media. See Jeremy W. Peters, Pentagon Eases Some Rules on Guantánamo Coverage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 
2010, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/11/us/11gitmo.html. However, the 
resulting September 10, 2010 revised “Media Ground Rules” remain unduly onerous and problematic. 
See generally Dep’t of Def., Media Ground Rules for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) (2010), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100910groundrules.pdf.
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of the biggest issues concerning military commissions relates to the fundamental 
question of whether the so-called “high-value detainees”—those directly involved in 
the 9/11 attacks—should be prosecuted before a commission in Guantánamo or in 
the federal courts. The Obama administration has wrestled with this, offering in 
2009 a set of guidelines for distinguishing the two categories of cases.30 Attorney 
General Eric H. Holder, Jr. was widely criticized in 2009 when he announced that 
half of the high-value detainees would be tried in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.31 He seemed to recede from this position when local 
officials in lower Manhattan objected,32 and the proposal seemed doomed when New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg joined in the objections, citing what seemed to 
be a wildly inflated cost estimate for courthouse and lower Manhattan security.33 It 
is telling that when Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was brought from Guantánamo to the 
Southern District for a civilian federal trial, the New York Police Department sought 
no financial assistance to bolster security around the Foley Square courthouse.34 In 
the end, the high value detainees were slated for military commission trials.
 What is the civil liberties interest? Since the Civil War, it had been widely 
understood that military courts could not be used to prosecute civilians when the 
local courts were open and transacting business.35 The Supreme Court applied this 
doctrine to curtail—after the fact—the use of military courts in the then Territory of 
Hawaii in 1946 after the threat of Japanese invasion had passed.36 Trial in federal 
district court affords a variety of constitutional protections not known to military 
commissions or courts-martial, such as indictment by grand jury and trial by a 
randomly drawn twelve-member jury of one’s peers. It also guarantees an independent 
judge protected by life tenure. In contrast, military commission jurors are handpicked 
and the presiding judges lack secure tenure required for judicial independence.37
30. Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann & Colonel Mark Martins to the Att’y Gen. & the Sec’y of Def. 
(July 20, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/law-of-war-prosecution-
prelim-report-7-20-09.pdf.
31. Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2010/01/30/nyregion/30trial.html.
32. Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 
2010, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE7DF113FF937A2575
2C1A96F9C8B63.
33. Al Baker, City Says 9/11 Trials Will Cost $200 Million a Year, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Jan. 6, 
2010, 3:41 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/city-says-911-trials-will-cost-200-
million-per-year/.
34. Devlin Barrett & Sean Gardiner, Terrorism Trial Security Relatively Scaled Back, Wall St. J. (Sept. 21, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703305004575504294061702442.html.
35. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
36. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1946).
37. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948i(b) (Supp. III 2009); Manual for Military 
Comm’ns R. 504, at II-30 (2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/2010_Manual_for_Military_
Commissions.pdf; Dep’t of Def., Regulation for Trial by Military Comm’ns ch. 5-2(a) (2007). 
In Weiss v. United States, the Court held that Fifth Amendment due process does not require fixed terms 
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iii. rights Of MiLitarY pErsOnnEL
 Another dimension of civil liberties in the post-9/11 era concerns the liberties of 
military personnel. Here a number of issues have emerged. For example, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are being fought in the Digital Age. This has generated a 
variety of issues. For example, although the military was—or at least seemed to 
be—content to have journalists embedded with combat units, it was less happy that 
soldiers were sending e-mails and digital photos from the battlespace.38 There was 
definitely concern for a time about blogging by G.I.’s.39 In one episode that created a 
firestorm of controversy, a commander in Iraq issued a general order that made it 
punishable for women soldiers to become pregnant and required them to be evacuated 
from the theater of operations.40 Soon after the order was made public, it was 
revoked.41
 Military free speech issues have reared their heads in the post-9/11 era as they 
have in other times. In 2010, General Stanley A. McChrystal was driven into 
retirement when a Rolling Stone article42 reported disparaging comments that 
members of his staff had made about Vice President Joseph R. Biden, among others.43 
Nothing in the circumstances indicated a violation of the UCMJ prohibition on 
of office for military judges in courts-martial. 510 U.S. 163, 164 (1994). There is no doubt that the 
Court would rule the same way in the case of military judges assigned to preside over military 
commissions. Military commission trial judges have no fixed term under the MCA or the Manual for 
Military Commissions. See Regulation for Trial by Military Comm’ns, supra, at ch. 6. They must 
be military judges under the UCMJ, but only Army and Coast Guard judges have terms of office by 
regulation and these are only for three years; judges from other branches have none. Judges of the Court 
of Military Commission Review (CMCR) have undefined terms of at least three years if they are 
civilians, but may be reassigned by the Secretary of Defense. Id. at ch. 25-11. Military judges sitting on 
that court have terms only to the extent their branch gives them a regulatory term of office, so once 
again, only Army and Coast Guard judges serving on the CMCR would have such terms, and then only 
short ones. Even those may be abbreviated in some circumstances.
38. See Army Monitors Soldiers’ Blogs, Military.com (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.military.com/
NewsContent/0,13319,117978,00.html; see Information Security/Website Alert, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Aug. 
6, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/webmasters/policy/infosec20060806.aspx.
39. See James Dao, Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops and Their Superiors Blog, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/us/09milblogs.html.
40. Pregnant G.I.’s Could Be Punished, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/
us/20general.html; Dep’t of the Army, 3d Infantry Div. Multi-Nat’l Div.-North, General 
Order No. 1 (GO #1), ¶ 3(s) (Nov. 4, 2009), http://bobmccarty.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/
MND-N-GO1-4NOV09.pdf (forbidding “[b]ecoming pregnant, or impregnating a Soldier, while 
assigned to the Task Force Marne [Area of Responsibility], resulting in the redeployment of the pregnant 
Soldier”).
41. Commander to Rescind a Provision on Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2009, at A8, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26military.html.
42. Michael Hastings, The Runaway General, Rolling Stone (July 22, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236.
43. Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, Obama Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change After Dismissal, N.Y. Times, 
June 24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/us/politics/24mcchrystal.html.
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speaking contemptuously of the President,44 but the case was a useful reminder that 
military personnel—especially commissioned officers—are not as free as civilians are 
to speak their minds.45
 Other issues regarding expressions of personal beliefs have also arisen. Some 
military personnel have objected to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to a 
trickle of requests for conscientious objection discharges and related litigation under 
a body of case law largely developed during the Vietnam War.46 In a few cases, 
soldiers who could not qualify under the standards for conscientious objector status 
nonetheless sought to avoid deployment. A leading example of this is First Lieutenant 
Ehren K. Watada, who fought the Army to a draw after protracted litigation in the 
military and civilian federal courts.47
 The military has striven to accommodate Muslim soldiers and sailors with respect 
to their worship and ritual foods.48 There is no reason to assume that Dr. Nidal 
Malik Hasan, an Army major who has been charged in connection with the multiple 
shootings that occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009,49 is in any way 
typical of the Muslim military population, but coupled with the kind of surprising, 
mindless hostility that emerged over plans to build a Muslim cultural center near the 
site of the World Trade Center, there is reason to fear that Muslim soldiers may find 
themselves under special, and unconstitutional, scrutiny.
 Until the delayed effective date of its repeal,50 the military continued to be bound 
by the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy Congress enacted in 199351 to prevent President 
Clinton from lifting the prohibition on military service by homosexuals. To be sure, 
the policy that homosexuality is incompatible with military service was an issue long 
before 9/11, but ironically, it may be that military operations in the wake of 9/11 
44. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).
45. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974); United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165 (1967) 
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the UCMJ Article 88 conviction of a junior officer who 
carried a sign denouncing President Lyndon Johnson as a “facist” [sic]); see also United States v. Brown, 
45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (affirming the conviction of a soldier who sought to organize a strike); 
United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (affirming the conviction of a soldier who blew 
his nose on the American f lag).
46. E.g., Hanna v. Sec’y of the U.S. Army, No. 06-11434-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74326 (D. Mass. 
Oct. 6, 2006), aff ’d, 513 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2008); Rogowskyj v. Conway, No. 06-1930(ESH), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17162 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2007).
47. Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (granting in part and denying in part Lt. 
Ehren K. Watada’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
48. The military chaplaincy now includes imams. See David Turner, Muslim Chaplain Covers Lots of Ground 
to Serve Soldiers, Am. Forces Press Serv. (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=51077. For an example of accommodation, see Rob Bellin, Ramadan begins for Muslim Soldiers, 
SOUNDOFF! (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.ftmeadesoundoff.com/news/3619/ramadan-begins-
muslim-soldiers.
49. Robert D. McFadden, Army Doctor Held in Ft. Hood Rampage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2009, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06forthood.html.
50. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
51. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
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contributed to the growing sentiment in favor of repeal. For instance, the loss of 
many Arabic translators as a result of the policy received media attention52 and was 
cited in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States.53 Another consideration is the simple 
fact that a country that demands repeated deployments of its military personnel, calls 
up reservists and National Guard troops, and exercises the “stop loss” power to keep 
on active duty those who would otherwise have been discharged, is under special 
pressure not to reject or separate those who are willing to serve and are otherwise 
qualified. This may be one of the few positive civil liberties developments in the 
military world traceable, albeit indirectly, to 9/11.
iV. thE bar
 To look only at the specific kinds of civil liberties issues that have emerged in the 
military setting since 9/11 is to tell only half the story. The other half has to do with 
lawyers and institutional relationships. The post-9/11 military chronicle includes 
both proud chapters and also some for which there is less reason to be proud.
 Members of the legal profession have played central roles in many of the salient 
post-9/11 events in the military arena. The Bush administration had very few lawyers 
in its inner national security circle: neither the President, the Vice President, the 
secretary of defense, the secretary of state, nor, for a time, the national security 
advisor were attorneys, and former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales was not 
one of our strongest.54 But lawyers played key roles in the events that generated a 
civil liberties crisis after 9/11, including former vice president Dick Cheney’s aide 
David S. Addington; John C. Yoo and Jay S. Bybee at the Department of Justice; 
and William J. Haynes II at the Pentagon.55 Considering the wreckage for which 
these attorneys are responsible, it is interesting that none of them has suffered any 
real penalty. In fact, it is rather a mixed bag. Mr. Bybee now serves as a U.S. Circuit 
Judge, while Mr. Haynes’s nomination to the Fourth Circuit failed.56 Professor Yoo 
has returned to the legal academy, and joins this symposium, despite calls to ostracize 
52. E.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Varied Forces Pushing Obama to Drop on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. Times, Feb. 
1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/us/politics/01military.html.
53. No. CV 04-08425-VAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93612 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010) (holding that the 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act Policy violates the First and Fifth Amendments and issuing a permanent 
injunction barring its enforcement), injunction stayed, Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 
10–56634, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22655 (9th Cir. 2010), application to vacate stay denied, Log Cabin 
Republicans v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 589 (2010).
54. See President Bush’s Cabinet, The White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
government/cabinet.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). The website includes a list of President Bush’s 
cabinet members and hyperlinks to biographies of each member.
55. See generally Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned 
into a War on American Ideals (2008); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and 
Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (2007).
56. Neil A. Lewis, Bush Drops Plans to Resubmit 3 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2007, at A18, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DEEDF1230F933A25752C0A9619C
8B63.
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him or revoke his academic tenure.57 The Justice Department found no intentional 
wrongdoing in his work on the so-called “Torture Memos,”58 and so far as is known, 
neither he nor any of the others noted here have been subjected to bar discipline. 
And, calls for Judge Bybee’s impeachment—a highly doubtful proposition, in my 
view, for pre–confirmation acts that do not go to the integrity of the confirmation 
process itself—have gone unheeded.59
 Have our bar institutions failed? This is not the place to pass judgment on any of 
these individuals, but rather to suggest that it is asking too much to expect the 
professional disciplinary system to stand as a serious bulwark against intrusions on 
civil liberties by public officials.
 The post-9/11 civil liberties issues have changed the military legal community, 
but perhaps less than one might have thought. For example, it is a fact that the Judge 
Advocates General (JAG) pushed back against some of the more appalling positions 
of the Bush administration.60 Their willingness to do so reflected both their moral 
and legal judgments, but also their concern that the Bush administration’s policies 
with respect to the treatment of detainees would come back to haunt American 
military personnel were the tables ever turned.61 For the sake of the profession, it 
would have been preferable for them to have been more open about this, including 
submitting their resignations on this basis.62 This is not asking too much, as all of 
them would have been able to retire with substantial lifetime benefits. And it would 
have been preferable for their opposition to become known directly from them as 
opposed to being leaked, as it was, to the New York City Bar Association.63 But 
57. See generally Marty Lederman, Yoo, Boalt and Academic Freedom: Dean Edley Speaks Out, Balkinization 
(Apr. 11, 2008, 12:43 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/04/post-no-6-yoo-boalt-and-academic-
fredom.html; Spencer Michels, Yoo’s Tenure Questioned Over Bush Torture Policy, PBS NewsHour (Oct. 
20, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec09/tenure_10-20.html.
58. See Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 
2010, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E02E0DA1239F933A15751
C0A9669D8B63&pagewanted=2.
59. See Neil A. Lewis, Official Defends Signing Interrogation Memos, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 2009, at A12, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29bybee.html.
60. Mark Mazzetti & Neil A. Lewis, Military Lawyers Caught in Middle on Tribunals, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 
2006 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/16/washington/16jags.html.
61. See, e.g., Josh White, Military Lawyers Fought Policy on Interrogations, Wash. Post, July 15, 2005, at 
A01; Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant 
of the U.S. Marine Corps, to Gen. Counsel of the Air Force ¶ 3a (Feb. 27, 2003), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Dep. Judge Advocate Gen. of the 
Air Force, to Gen. Counsel of the Air Force ¶ 1d (Feb. 6, 2003), http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.
pdf; Memorandum from Rear Adm. Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate Gen. of the Navy, to Gen. 
Counsel of the Air Force ¶ 3 (Feb. 6, 2003), http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.
62. See Eugene R. Fidell, Where is the Courage to Walk Away?, Navy Times, Aug. 22, 2005, at 46, available at 
http://www.navytimes.com/legacy/new/0-NAVYPAPER-1002042.php.
63. See Joe Conason, Lack of Protection, Salon (May 7, 2004, 13:46 ET), http://www.salon.com/news/
opinion/joe_conason/2004/05/07/rights/index.html; see generally Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N. 
Y., Comm. on Int’l Human Rights & Comm. on Military Affairs and Justice, Human Rights 
Standards Applicable to United States’ Interrogation of Detainees 2 (2004), http://www.
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these are quibbles. The JAGs who pushed back or stood their ground deserve 
recognition and the Nation’s thanks.
 The post-9/11 era saw a substantial improvement in the institutional power of 
the Judge Advocates General (TJAGs). After the unpleasantness over the Torture 
Memos had died down, Congress authorized the TJAGs a third star, making them 
Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals.64 This will in theory give them greater 
clout in Pentagon decisionmaking in the future,65 even though there are plenty of 
other officers in those pay grades. Efforts were also made to iron out relationships 
between the civilian general counsels of the military departments and the TJAGs.
 Will the TJAGs become a bulwark for civil liberties? I am certain those who 
were personally involved in the struggle with Mr. Haynes over the treatment of 
detainees believe they already are. I will only add a small dubitante: when it comes to 
reform of the American military justice system, they have not been at the 
forefront.66
 What of the less senior judge advocates who have been drawn into the defense of 
Guantánamo detainees? Many of them displayed moral courage as well as high 
professionalism in providing zealous representation to detainees. Some were passed 
over for promotion to higher ranks, whether for this or other reasons.67 Equally 
impressive has been the commitment of uniformed prosecutors, a number of whom 
showed courage in objecting to the pursuit of pointless cases and insisting on ethical 
abcny.org/pdf/HUMANRIGHTS.pdf (noting that information about alleged details of interrogation 
techniques used at U.S. detention facilities “have come from government officials speaking on the 
condition that they would not be identified”).
64. Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 543, 122 Stat. 3, 114 (2008) 
(amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 3037(a), 5148(b), 8037(a)). The incumbents were neither automatically 
promoted nor entitled to promotion. See Memorandum Opinion from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., on 
Promotions of the Judge Advocates Gen. Under Section 543 of the Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, at 6 (Apr. 14, 2008). Mr. Haynes attempted to block the three-star legislation. See 
generally Scott Horton, Jim Haynes’s Long Twilight Struggle, Harper’s Mag., Feb. 2008, http://harpers.
org/archive/2008/02/hbc-90002336.
65. “An extra star means the legal officers would be allowed in high-level Pentagon meetings now closed to 
two-star generals. Supporters say that staff at the Pentagon often set up meetings where only personnel 
at the three-star level and above are invited. The TJAGs are automatically left out.” Roxana Tiron, 
Graham Focuses on Glimmer of TJAGs’ 3rd Star, The Hill, Oct. 3, 2006, at 14, available at http://thehill.
com/business-a-lobbying/2371-graham-focuses-on-glimmer-of-tjags-3rd-star.
66. At the same time they were resisting the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, the JAGs were 
also resisting efforts to persuade the military services to post court-martial dockets online. They later 
did so, but their initial joint refusal was inexplicable. See Eugene R. Fidell, Marvin Anderson Lecture: 
Transparency, 2009, Address Before the University of California, Hastings College of the Law (Mar. 
23, 2009), in 61 Hastings L.J. 457, 466–67 (2009).
67. See, e.g., Mori v. Dep’t of the Navy, 731 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2010); Paper: Detainee Lawyer Must Leave 
Navy, Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2006, 9:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800603.html. 
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conduct and preserving their own prosecutorial independence.68 On the whole, the 
post-9/11 era will be—and deserves to be—looked back on as a high point in the 
history of American military law.
 The civil liberties picture is also a good deal brighter in the military field as a 
result of the inf luence of civilians outside the government. Hundreds of civilian 
attorneys volunteered to take up the challenge of representing Guantánamo 
detainees.69 They paid a price in terms of the value of their time and considerable 
out-of-pocket expenses and were supported by their partners and regular clients. 
Efforts to punish them by suggesting that their fee-paying clients find other counsel 
failed.70 This is a bright chapter in the story. Would it happen again if comparable 
issues arose in a time of serious retrenchment within the profession? I hope we never 
have to find out.
V. MisUsE Of thE MiLitarY
 Issues of improper use of the military have, happily, been few in the post-9/11 
years. One matter that has lingered, however, is a claim that “force protection” 
personnel at Fort Lewis, Washington, spied on a local anti-war group.71 In addition, 
if the cross-border f low of undocumented immigrants continues, it is likely that 
military forces will increasingly be looked to for securing the border, under the rubric 
of national security in the post-9/11 era.72 Surging drug-war violence on the Mexican 
side of the border may have a similar effect.
Vi. EffECts On thE JUdiCiarY
 Finally, and perhaps most elusive, is the effect of the post-9/11 military related 
activity on the federal courts. There are three aspects to this effect. First, a generation 
of Supreme Court Justices has now had to grapple repeatedly with these issues, and 
there is every reason to believe that they will continue to do so as Justices Sotomayor 
and Kagan settle in to their new responsibilities. The Court was far too slow to act 
as the first post-9/11 cases reached it. Specifically, it should have been more aggressive 
in holding special terms of court. As the years of detention at Guantánamo have 
mounted, the pace of the judicial process has become ever more disappointing and 
indefensible, even allowing for judicial restraint.
 The second aspect has to do with the global nature of the fallout of post-9/11 
military legal activity. Although it has not been widely recognized in the United 
68. E.g., United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 78 (May 9, 2008), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/
documents/reporter_june19.pdf?rd=111 (ruling on unlawful command inf luence claim).
69. See Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms over Detainees, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2007, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html.
70. Id.
71. See Jeremy Pawloski, Group Says Man Was Spy, The Olympian, July 28, 2009, at 1A, available at http://
www.theolympian.com/2009/07/28/922995/group-says-man-was-spy.html.
72. See Randal C. Archibold, Obama to Send up to 1,200 Troops to Border, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/us/26border.html?_r=1&th&emc=th.
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States, litigation f lowing one way or another from our military activities has kept 
courts busy in a number of other countries. A notable example is the litigation in 
Canada seeking to compel the Canadian government to make diplomatic 
representations on behalf of a military commission defendant, Omar Khadr, because 
he was a minor at the time of the offenses with which he had been charged.73 
Guantánamo-related issues have also come up in British and other foreign courts.74 
Indeed, it was a Law Lord who first prominently described Guantánamo as a “legal 
black hole.”75 This is not to say that foreign developments will play any specific role in 
the administration of justice here, but they demonstrate yet again that our legal system 
does not function in a vacuum. The administration of justice is as likely to attract 
foreign interest as are policy pronouncements from the executive branch or 
congressional enactments. Mindful that the significance of foreign legal developments 
is a matter on which the Justices have widely varying orientations,76 some at least will 
find foreign developments in this area worthy of consideration even if they never 
actually alter an outcome. We are not alone, and have much to learn from foreign 
judges as well as other international actors such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, which plays a central role in administration of the Geneva Conventions.77
 Third, many federal district judges have found themselves drawn into post-9/11 
matters related to the military, as the responsibility has fallen to them to hear and 
decide the numerous habeas corpus cases arising from the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals and, more recently, the detentions at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.78 
As trial judges, they have had a unique opportunity to evaluate “up close and 
personal” the government’s evidence and decisionmaking. Given the government’s 
uneven track record in these cases,79 one is tempted to assume that the effect would 
be an erosion of the confidence these judges would otherwise be inclined to place in 
government decisionmaking and litigation claims. This too is impossible to measure, 
but it seems a not-unlikely outcome, with potentially significant implications for 
other areas of judicial review of agency action involving the military and claims of 
national security.
73. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.). 
74. See R (Binyam Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commw. Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 158 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
75. Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2004).
76. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
77. Building respect for the Law, Int’l Committee of the Red Cross (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/
eng/what-we-do/building-respect-ihl/overview-building-respect-ihl.htm. 
78. See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
79. The numbers have shifted over time, but as of this writing Guantánamo habeas petitioners have prevailed 
more often than not. Andy Worthington, Guantánamo and Habeas Corpus: Wins and Losses, Part 1, The 
Future of Freedom Found. (July 19, 2010), http://www.fff.org/comment/com1007f.asp.
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Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 Some bullets do their worst damage not at the point of entry but when they 
encounter tissue and bone within the body. So it may be with the aftermath of 9/11. 
Certainly in the part of the legal forest with which I have chiefly been concerned, 
the 9/11 shell has tumbled in ways that have caused serious internal injuries. But our 
legal institutions—tempered by the experience of the last decade—are robust enough 
to survive those injuries, and will continue to evolve and, I hope, gain strength as the 
legal fallout of 9/11 continues and as new aspects of the post-9/11 era come under 
examination. It is incumbent on all of us to ensure that outcome. With wisdom, 
effort, and luck, we may not even need another such symposium in 2021, even if 
experience suggests otherwise.
